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NOTES
LEGITIMATE USE EXCLUSIONS THROUGH ZONING:
APPLYING A BALANCING TEST
Zoning has emerged in this century as the predominant means of
restricting private land use for the benefit of the community.' The
field of zoning law,2 however, encompasses a wide range of unanswered
questions, largely resulting from the Supreme Court's unwillingness to
provide guidance.3 One of these questions concerns whether a munici1 New York City passed the first comprehensive zoning ordinance in this country in
1916 after an extensive six-year study. 1 J. METzENBAUM, LAw OF ZONING 7 (2d ed. 1955).
Ten years later the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of zoning. Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); see note 3 infra.
Zoning in many ways is merely an outgrowth of the Industrial Revolution. 1 A.
RATHKOPF, TnE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING ch. 1, § 1 (1966); E. ROBERTS, LAND-UsE
PLANNING 3-3 to -7 (1971). The inherent power of municipalities to provide for the health,
safety, morals, and general welfare of their citizens provides the legal basis for zoning.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra at 391. The power of municipalities to enact
zoning ordinances in the name of the general welfare alone now seems settled, although
some judges have strongly condemned zoning on this basis. See, e.g., Vickers v. Township
Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 261-62, 181 A.2d 129, 145 (1962) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied,
371 US. 233 (1963); Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Easttown Township, 393 Pa. 62, 77, 141 A.2d 851,
859 (1958) (dissenting opinion); see also Roberts, The Demise of Property Law, 57 CORNELL
L. R v. 1, 6-20 (1971). For an illustration of how far governing bodies may attempt to
push the concept of general welfare, see People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272,
240 N.YS.2d 734, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963), where an ordinance prohibited the
erection and maintenance of clotheslines in a front or side yard.
One commentator sees the purpose of zoning as twofold: (1) to preserve the neighborhood's true character and (2) to protect the value of an owner's property. E. yoKELY,
ZONING LAw AND PRACTICE

13 (2d ed. 1953). A third purpose might be added: to allow

for maximum continuity in a community's growth through effective land-use planning.
Although Yokely saw zoning's concern to be preserving neighborhoods and protecting
land investments, its more modem concern is to facilitate community development. For
an account of zoning as a planning device, see E. ROBERTS, supra.
2 Several authors have attempted to cover the entire range of zoning law. See 1 C.
ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAw ch. 7 (1968); 8-8A E. McQuILUEN, THE LAw OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1965); 1-3 J. METENBAUM, supra note 1; 1-3 A. RAT'HKOPF, supra note 1; 1-2 E. YoKELY, supra note 1.
3 In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US. 365 (1926), the Supreme Court
declared that zoning, as a valid exercise of the police power, would not constitute a taking that would require compensation under the fifth amendment as long as the ordinance
bore a reasonable relationship to the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the
community. (For a first-hand account of the Euclid case by a member of the drafting
commission who served as the village's counsel throughout the lengthy proceeding, see I
J. MErRENBAum, supra note 1, at 52-65.) Two years after Euclid, the Court declared
unconstitutional a zoning ordinance which bore no substantial relation to community
welfare. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
Since 1928 the Court has declined to consider any cases in the zoning area. Some
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pality has the power to prohibit entirely certain legitimate business uses4
within its boundaries. 5 To determine the validity of prohibitive zoning
clauses-often couched within otherwise comprehensive use plansocourts have applied three separate tests.7 Contrary to established evidentiary rules, the most recent of these tests shifts the burden of presenting
evidence to the body enacting the questioned legislation, thereby requiring a new balancing of interests by the court. This test provides an
extended degree of judicial flexibility for dealing with the complex
problems of land-use planning.

VALID=TY TESTS FOR TOTAL USE EXCLUSIONS

A.

The Reasonable Relationship Test

Most courts, in deciding challenges to the validity of legitimate
business use exclusions, have applied the traditional due process test
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.:8 whether the ordinance, or in this case the prohibition,
commentators have argued, however, that in related cases the Court has expanded the
power of municipalities to zone. See, e.g., Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne,
10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953), which upheld a
zoning ordinance fixing the minimum size of a dwelling within a residential district, and
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), an eminent domain case which upheld the federal
government's right to condemn property for aesthetic purposes under the District of
Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945. The Court in Berman stated in part:
It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should
be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well
as carefully patrolled.... If those who govern the District of Columbia decide
that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing
in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Id. at 33.
4 For purposes of this discussion, legitimate business uses will be defined as those
uses that have not been held to constitute nuisances and that a court would not be likely
to classify as such.
5 This note will not examine exclusionary or "snob" zoning, in which minimum lot
or dwelling size requirements tend to exclude certain economic classes. This area has
been examined extensively. See, e.g., R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRAGrIccS
AND PoLIciEs (1966); Aloi, Goldberg & White, Racial and Economic Segregation by Zoning:
Death Knell for Home Rule?, 1969 U. Toumo L. PEv. 65; Symposium: Exclusionary Zoning, 22 SYRAcusE L. R1v. 465-626 (1971); Note, Low-Income Housing and the Equal Protection Clause, 56 CoRaN.
L. REv. 343 (1971); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal
Protection, 84 HARv. L. R-v. 1645 (1971).
6 See 1 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 1, at 15-5.
7 See text accompanying notes 8-60 infra.
8 272 U.S. 565 (1926). See note S supra.
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bears a reasonable relationship to the public health, morals, safety, or
general welfare. 9 Since a strong presumption of validity attaches to any
zoning enactment, 10 a heavy burden of proof is placed upon the party
challenging the ordinance." The attacker is faced with the difficult task
of proving a negative-that the regulation bears no reasonable relationship to the general welfare. Considering the broad nature of the
concept of the general welfare, 12 such a burden cannot often be met. 13
Under this approach, however, unless the attacker can either actually
9 Id. at 395; see Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17, 118 A.2d 401 (1955); New York Cent.
R.R. v. Borough of Ridgefield, 84 NJ. Super. 85, 201 A.2d 67 (App. Div. 1964); Newark
Milk & Cream Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills, 47 N.J. Super. 806, 135 A.2d 682 (Law Div.
1957); Caudill v. Village of Milford, 10 Ohio Misc. 1, 225 N.E.2d 802 (C.P. 1967); Oregon
City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965).
10 Ann Arbor v. Northwest Park Constr. Corp., 280 F.2d 212 (6th Cir. 1960); Dennis
v. Tonka Bay, 156 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1946); Scarborough Apartments, Inc. v. Englewood,
9 N.J. 182, 87 A.2d 537 (1952); Islip v. F.E. Summers Coal & Lumber Co., 257 N.Y. 167,
177 N.E. 409 (1931); DiSanto v. Zoning Ed. of Adjustment, 410 Pa. 331, 189 A.2d 135
(1963); but see note 14 infra.
Close questions as to reasonableness generally are to be decided in favor of the
legislative enactment. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 869 U.S. 590, 595 (1962).
11 Robertson v. Salem, 191 F. Supp. 604 (D. Ore. 1961); Leighton v. Minneapolis, 16
F. Supp. 101 (D. Minn. 1986); Oliva v. City of Garfield, 1 N.J. 184, 62 A.2d 673 (1948);
Rodgers v. Tarrytown, 802 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951); DiSanto v. Zoning Ed. of
Adjustment, 410 Pa. 331, 189 A.2d 135 (1963).
12 [U]nder circumstances of particular cases, public welfare includes public convenience, general prosperity, the greatest welfare of the public, all the great public needs, "what is sanctioned by usage or held by the prevailing morality or
strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary,"
whatever is required for the public good, the suppression of all things hurtful to
the comfort and welfare of society, and finally all regulations which promote the
general interest and prosperity of the public.
8 E. MCQUILLEN, supra note 2, § 25.20, at 60, quoting Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219
US. 104, 111 (1911).
13 One student of the subject, writing in the fall of 1959, [found] that since
liberality of application of the principles was stated so strongly ... , this court has
sustained the challenged ordinance in every case but one.... And the record has
not changed substantially since.
Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 259 n.1, 181 A.2d 129, 143-44 n.1 (1962), citing
Cunningham, Control of Land Use in New Jersey by Means of Zoning, 14 RuTGERs L.
REv. 37, 48 (1959).
An example of how onerous a burden can be placed upon a plaintiff seeking to
challenge a zoning ordinance may be found in Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400
P.2d 255 (1965). The Supreme Court of Oregon, sitting en banc, held that a legitimate
business use, in this case auto wrecking, could be excluded from an entire community if
there was any rational basis for such an exclusion. The court found such a basis in community aesthetics, citing People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d
734, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963). In doing so, the court used as a basis for upholding a total exclusion a community interest which is not even entirely accepted as a valid
basis for regulation. Cf. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954); but cf. National Land &
Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Ed. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
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overcome the presumption of validity 4 attaching to the zoning ordinance or demonstrate that it is invalid on its face,' 5 the ordinance will
effectively prohibit his desired land use.
Critical differences between total exclusion provisions and other
types of zoning ordinance, however, require that different tests be applied. Euclid, although upholding the validity of a comprehensive
zoning plan, did not specifically pass upon total use prohibitions.1 6 The
Supreme Court quoted approvingly a prior Illinois case:
The constantly increasing density of our urban populations,
the multiplying forms of industry and the growing complexity of
our civilization make it necessary for the State, either directly or
through some public agency by its sanction, to limit individual
activities to a greater extent than formerly....
"... The segregation of industries commercial pursuits and
dwellings to particular districts in a city, when exercised reasonably, may bear a rational relation to the health, morals, safety and
general welfare of the community....,,7
Euclid thus upheld zoning as a regulatory rather than exclusionary
device. The philosophy of zoning, as the Court defined it, was "not
that industrial development shall cease ... , but that the course of such
14

[IThe presumption of validity ... is only a presumption and may be overcome

or rebutted not only by clear evidence aliunde, but also by a showing on its face
or in the light of facts of which judicial notice can be taken, of transgression of
constitutional limitation or the bounds of reason.
Moyant v. Paramus, 30 N.J. 528, 535, 154 A.2d 9, 12 (1959); accord, Miami Beach v. First
Trust Co., 45 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1949); Thomas v. Town of Bedford, 29 Misc. 2d 861, 214
N.Y.S.2d 145 (Sup. Ct. 1961). See text accompanying notes 43 &c61 infra.
15 See Kielb v. Weinberg Realty Corp., 147 Conn. 677, 165 A.2d 601 (1960); Stemwedel
v. Village of Kenilworth, 14 IlM.2d 470, 158 N.E.2d 79 (1958).
16 Section 7 of the Euclid zoning ordinance enumerated 45 uses entirely prohibited
from the village. However, none of these at that time was a legitimate business use as
defined supra note 4. See 3 J. METzENBAUM, supra note 1, at 1945.

A valid zoning plan, to promote the general welfare, must be comprehensive. 1 E.
YommY, supra note 1, at 13. A comprehensive zoning plan is one which affects the use of
land throughout the entire municipality-one that is an integrated and rational partition
of the community, providing uniformly for legitimate uses within specified districts.
Ordinarily, the zoning power to forbid a use in one district means relocation of that use
in another. See 1 C. ANTmAU, supra note 2, at 321; 8 E. McQuMLEN, supra note 2, §
25.119b, at 821. Total use prohibitions can arguably be viewed as instances of partial
zoning, thereby violating the comprehensive plan requirement.
Zoning is an attempt to regulate the use of property according to a master plan;
nuisance and piecemeal usage regulations-antecedents to modern comprehensive zoning-are distinguishable as constituting the proper means to deal with particular harmful uses. See note 24 infra. Zoning ordinances not only deal with harmful uses, but also
regulate all uses throughout the entire community. 1 J. METZENBAXM, supra note 1, at 19.
17 272 U.S. at 892, quoting Aurora v. Burns, 319 I. 84, 98-94, 149 N.E. 784, 788 (1925)
(emphasis added).
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development shall proceed within definitely fixed lines."'18 Furthermore, the Court did not give municipalities unrestrained license to
determine how far zoning ordinances might proceed. Indeed, Mr. Justice Sutherland gave the first indication that a balancing test might be
appropriate in determining the validity of a zoning ordinance. 19 In any
event, it cannot be unequivocally inferred from Euclid that a legitimate
use may be entirely barred from a community simply by virtue of the
general "reasonable relationship" test used to sustain a mere regulatory
ordinance.
This conclusion is supported by the actual language of most zoning
ordinances. These ordinances are generally municipal creations, established pursuant to specific grants of power by state legislatures. Most 20
are patterned after the Standard Zoning Enabling Act 2 ' issued in 1926
by the Department of Commerce, which provides:
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general
welfare of the community, the legislative body of cities and incorporated villages is hereby empowered to regulate and restrict...
the location and use of buildings, structures,
and land for trade,
22
industry, residence, or other purposes.
The purpose of this provision, like the purpose of the ordinance examined in Euclid, is "the regulation and restriction of property in
particular zones so as to protect such zones." 28 The goal is not exclusion
or prohibition of uses; nuisance doctrines are better suited for that
purpose.24 Rather, the aim is regulation of uses. Therefore, total use
exclusion is arguably no more authorized by the Standard Zoning Enabling Act than it is by the Supreme Court's holding in Euclid.25
18 Id. at 389.

19 "It is not meant by this, however, to exclude the possibility of cases where the
general public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the
municipality would not be allowed to stand in the way." Id. at 390.
20 See ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE app. A, at 212 (rent. Draft No. 1, 1968).
21 U.S. DEP'T OF COMzmtCE, STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING Acr (rev. ed. 1926).

22 Id. § 1 (emphasis added).
23 1 E. YoKELY, supra note 1, at 13.
24 The common law allowed nuisances to be regulated and even prohibited long
before the enactment of zoning ordinances. See, e.g., Barnard v. Finkbeiner, 162 App.
Div. 319, 147 N.YS. 514 (2d Dep't 1914); Bowden v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 29
Misc. 171, 60 N.Y.S. 835 (Sup. Ct. 1895). Other early restrictions on land use included
injurious use regulations, fire zones, tenement house codes, building codes, sanitary codes,
and height ordinances. See 1 J. METzENBAUm, supra note 1, at 1-51; note 16 supra.

25 The Standard Act, however, contains the following marginal language: "This
phrase [restrict and regulate] is considered sufficiently all-embracing. Nothing will be
gained by adding such terms as 'exclude,' 'segregate,' 'limit,' 'determine."' US. Das"T OF
COMMERCE, STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING AcT n.6 (rev. ed. 1926). Courts have generally
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Total Use Exclusions Prohibited

A number of courts have held that prohibition of a use throughout a community is not a valid exercise of the police power, absent a
showing that the use constitutes a nuisance per se. 26 These courts generally reason that zoning must be regulatory rather than exclusionary
and that zoning plans must be comprehensive to be valid; 27 they also
occasionally rely on the lack of statutory authority28 or the availability

of other control devices, 29 particularly nuisance.30 In these jurisdictions
one who challenges the statute must simply show that the desired use
is legitimate and that it is totally barred.31 The ordinance will then be
32
declared invalid on its face.
There is a serious weakness in this approach, however. Communities today are based heavily upon economic interaction and interrelationships. For practical reasons they should at times have the ability to
exclude certain legitimate uses throughout the municipality. Although
this power should not be absolute, a complete inability to bar certain
otherwise lawful uses might undermine realization of one of zoning's
primary goals, the "planning and development of the city in a manner
refused to accept the argument that the language of the enabling act prevents exclusion
of a legitimate use from the entire community.
We think that the legislature simply intended to indicate the general basis
for classifying the zones and that the language was not intended to say one way
or the other whether the city could wholly exclude a business from conducting its
activities within the city.
Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 41, 400 P.2d 255, 259 (1965); accord, Gust v. Canton,

342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772 (1955); Morris v. Postma, 41 NJ. 854, 196 A.2d 792 (1964);
Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967).
26 These courts place heavy emphasis on the right to property use as long as the use
does not interfere with the general welfare in such a way as would constitute a nuisance.
Any total prohibition of a use that is not a nuisance is considered confiscatory and
requires compensation under the fifth amendment. Lakeside Realty Co. v. Town of
Berlin, 20 Conn. Supp. 188, 129 A.2d 628 (Super. Ct. 1956); Awtry & Lowndes Co. v.
Atlanta, 78 Ga. App. 890, 50 S.E.2d 868 (1948), rev'd, 205 Ga. 296, 53 S.E,2d 358 (1949);
Builder's Supply & Lumber Co. v. Northlake, 21 11. 2d 14, 170 N.E.2d 597 (1960); People
v. Village of Skokie, 408 II. 397, 97 N.E.2d 310 (1951); Bzovi v. City of Livonia, 350 Mich.
489, 87 N.W.2d 110 (1957).
27 See, e.g., Johnson v. Huntsville, 249 Ala. 36, 29 So. 2d 842 (1947); Eden v. Town
Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 189 Conn. 59, 89 A.2d 746 (1952); McHugh v. Board of Zoning
Adjustment, 336 Mass. 682, 147 N.E.2d 761 (1958).
28 See, e.g., People v. Village of Skokie, 408 111.
397, 404, 97 N.E.2d 310, 313 (1951).
29 See, e.g., New Jersey Used Car Trade Ass'n v. Magee, 1 N.J. Super. 371, 63 A.2d
751 (Ch. 1948).
80 See, e.g., Cox v. Pocatello, 77 Idaho 225, 291 P.2d 282 (1955).
81 Builder's Supply & Lumber Co. v. Northlake, 21 fI1. 2d 14, 170 N.E2d 597 (1960).
82 See notes 14-15 and accompanying text supra; see also Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237,
263 A.2d 395 (1970).
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which meets the needs of the community."' s The key lies in balancing
the needs of the community with the property rights of the individual.
C.

Balancing

Rather than entirely prohibiting total use exclusions or emphasizing the traditionally strong presumption of validity that attaches to
zoning ordinances 34 and thereby placing a heavy burden of proof upon
the attacker,3 5 a few courts have recently shown a degree of judicial
invention. They have refrained from giving municipalities carte
blanche power to prohibit legitimate uses, which is what they often
have in fact under the "reasonable relationship" test, yet at the same
time have allowed communities certain regulatory leeway for the ultimate protection of the general welfare. These courts have attempted to
achieve this flexibility through shifting the burden of proof in total
exclusion cases. Although expressly restating the presumption of validity, these courts have in fact shifted the burden to the municipality,
obliging it to demonstrate the relationship between the total use exclusion and the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of its citizens.38
A Pennsylvania decision in 196737 laid the foundation for a formal
shifting of the burden of proof in that state. West Whiteland Township had enacted a comprehensive zoning plan in 1957 which prohibited, inter alia, quarrying in any district of the municipality.38
Exton Quarries, the owner of approximately ninety-nine acres of land
in the township, filed an application for a use variance. It was denied.
Subsequently the quarry appealed and the court of common pleas held
the prohibition unconstitutional.3 9 In Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning
Board of Adjustment,40 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that
the state's enabling act did authorize township-wide bans on selected
33 Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 49-50, 400 P.2d 255, 263 (1965). See also
Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 514, 64 A.2d 347, 350
(1949), which, in upholding a residential community's total exclusion of heavy industry,
took judicial notice of "the residential character of the Borough . . . and the suitability
of its location for such development."
34 See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
85 See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
36 One New York court declared invalid a zoning ordinance barring all billiard
parlors because the municipality could not show a rational relationship between the
prohibition and the general welfare. G.B. Billiard Corp. v. Horn, 42 Misc. 2d 673, 248
N.YS..2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
37 Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Ed. of Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967).
38 Id. at 46, 228 A.2d at 172.
39 Id., 228 A.2d at 172.
40 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967).
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uses of land.41 However, although the court maintained that "[a] challenge to the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance must overcome the
presumption of its validity," 42 the opinion carefully added: "The burden of so doing, though heavy, is maintainable and courts may not
make it so 'onerous as to foreclose, for all practical purposes, a landowner's avenue of redress against the infringement of constitutionally
protected rights.'

"43

Thus, although the court was apparently honoring the presumption of validity, it was in fact opening the door to a broader type of
judicial review through a reallocation of the traditional burden of
proof:
The constitutionality of zoning ordinances which totally prohibit legitimate businesses such as quarrying from an entire community should be regarded with particular circumspection; for

unlike the constitutionality of most restrictions on property rights
imposed by other ordinances, the constitutionality of total prohibitions of legitimate businesses cannot be premised on the fundamental reasonableness of allocating to each type of activity a
particular location in the community.... [W]e believe that [such].
a zoning ordinance ...

must bear a more substantial relationship

to the public health, safety, morals and general welfare than an
merely confines that business to a certain area in
ordinance which 44
the municipality.
If to be valid a total use exclusion must bear a "more substantial
relationship" to police power objectives, the attacker arguably meets
his burden of proof by showing that the ordinance has only a slight
relationship to the general welfare; rather than proving the negative
proposition that the ordinance is totally unrelated to police power
goals, he wins rmerely if he can show that the relationship is weak.
This burden can be easily met. A sensible inference from this Exton
language, therefore, is that the burden of proof in cases of total use
exclusions shifts to the municipality, which must show a substantial
relationship between the ordinance and valid police power objectives
to sustain the ordinance's validity. In Exton, the court discussed the
character of the community and concluded that the showing made by
the township was insufficient.45 Thus, even though the court cited lan41 The language of the enabling act was similar to that of the Standard Act in that
it contained the phrase "regulate and restrict . . . the location and use of buildings,
structures and land." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 67001 (1957).
42 425 Pa. at 58, 228 A.2d at 178.
43 Id., 228 A.2d at 178, quoting National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd.

of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 522, 215 A.2d 597, 607 (1965).
44 Id. at 59-60, 228 A.2d at 179 (emphasis added).
45 Id., 228 A.2d at 179.
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guage placing the burden on the landowner, it subtly but dearly
shifted the burden to the township.
Using the Exton rationale as a wedge, the Commonwealth Court
of Pennsylvania formalized this shifting of the burden in Beaver Gasoline Co. v Zoning Hearing Board.48 Gasoline stations had been entirely excluded from the town of Osborne by a zoning ordinance.
Beaver's application for a building permit to erect a station had been
denied. The lower court found that Beaver had not met the burden of
overcoming the heavy presumption of validity attaching to the ordinance.47 Facing the issue squarely, the commonwealth court held that
the lower court had erred in finding that Beaver had not presented
sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of validity. 48 Citing

Exton as authority, the Beaver court concluded that as to the presumption of validity,
[t]he discrimination between legitimate businesses by prohibiting
only certain ones without identifying with specificity the ends
thereof is not supported by... a fundamentally reasonable principle. Therefore we cannot hold, nor do we believe the Supreme
Court to have held, that such a prohibition must be presumed to
be valid.49
Beaver required the plaintiff to show only three things to overcome the presumption of validity: (1) the legitimacy of the prohibited
business use; (2) the prohibition's uniformity throughout the municipality; and (3) the conformity of the business to all other zoning and
building code requirements.5 0 The court made no mention of a required showing of unreasonableness. It concluded that Beaver had
shown the necessary three facts, and it therefore shifted the burden of
proof to the borough and presumed the ordinance to be invalid.51 Not
46 1 Pa. Cmwlth. 458, 275 A.2d 702, remanded,Pa. -, 285 A.2d 501 (1971). Accord,
Daikeler v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, I Pa. Cmwlth. 455, 275 A.2d 696 (1971).
47 Id. at -, 275 A.2d at 703.
48 Id. at -, 275 A.2d at 704.
49 Id. at -, 275 A.2d at 704.
5o Id. at -, 275 A.2d at 704-05.
51 Total use prohibitions, such as we find here are inherently discriminatory and
therefore in violation of the Constitutional rights of the citizens of the munidpality which create them. The courts of this Commonwealth should not and will
not permit such an ordinance to exist without clearly substantiated proof of its
relationship to the governmental police power.
Id. at -, 275 A.2d at 706.
Such reasoning is particularly compelling when the use prohibited is an important
public use such as churches or schools. See, e.g., Board of Cooperative Educ. Servs. v.
Gaynor, 33 App. Div. 2d 701, 306 N.YS.2d 216 (2d Dep't 1969); Union Free School Dist.
v. Hewlett Bay Park, 279 App. Div. 618, 107 N.Y.S.2d 858 (2d Dep't 1951); North Shore
Unitarian Soc'y, Inc. v. Village of Plandome, 200 Misc. 524, 109 N.YS.2d 803 (Sup. Ct.

1951).
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only would the borough have to demonstrate a relationship between
the ordinance and the general welfare of the community, but it would
also have to demonstrate some reasonable basis for distinguishing between the prohibited use and other uses that might produce the same
deleterious effect.5 2 The borough would also have to show the absence
of alternative means to solve the problem.58 Not surprisingly, the Beaver
court found that the borough had failed to meet its burden and declared the ordinance invalid insofar as it prohibited gasoline stations
within the entire municipality.
On appeal the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania accepted the commonwealth court's reasoning. 54 The court was, however, careful to limit
the rule only to those cases where the total prohibition is of "otherwise
legitimate land uses."5 5 If the applicant can show, perhaps even by
"common experience," 5 6 that his proposed land use is in fact legitimate,
he has succeeded in meeting his burden and "the municipality must
then establish the legitimacy of the prohibition by evidence establishing what public interest is sought to be protected." 57 The court reemphasized the general presumption of statutory validity, but concluded
that under the facts presented, "to require a party to prove a negative
such as the nonexistence of a proper zoning purpose [would be] to raise
difficulty to virtual impossibility."58 Therefore it becomes the responsibility of the municipality to "establish the validity of a total ban." 59
Shifting the burden of proof not only removes an onerous burden
from the attacker,60 but also places the burden on the party possessing
We hold that the validity of the ordinance depends upon the finding by the
Borough Council that gasoline stations, if established in that Borough would
have caused undesirable effects upon the health, safety, morals and general welfare of that community, and that these undesirable effects are not caused by
52

other permitted uses nor are they capable of cure by regulation.

1 Pa. Cmwlth. at -, 275 A.2d at 705 (emphasis in original).
53 Id. at -,

275 A.2d at 705.

54 Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., - Pa. -, 285 A.2d 501 (1971). The
decision of the commonwealth court was vacated; the case was remanded, but only to
give the municipality opportunity to prove the validity of the ordinance, since "a
reading of the prior law in this field indicates that . . . municipalities were not aware
of any duty to come forward with any evidence in order to sustain their zoning ordinances." Id. at -, 285 A.2d at 505.
55 Id. at 285 A.2d at 504-05.
56 Id. at - 285 A.2d at 505.
57 Id. at -, 285 A.2d at 504.
58 Id.
59 Id. at -, 285 A.2d at 505. Justice Jones's concurring opinion reached the same con-

clusion by considering the risk of nonpersuasion and the burden of producing evidence,
two concepts he felt were not properly distinguished by the majority.
60 The time must never come when, because of frustration with concepts foreign
to their legal training, courts abdicate their judicial responsibility to protect
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the supposed expertise. By prohibiting a legitimate use, a zoning board
has demonstrated its belief that the use, although legitimate, would
have a significant adverse impact upon public welfare. Placing the burden on the board merely forces it to establish some rational basis for
its action. More importantly, it also allows for broader judicial inquiry
into the validity of ordinances in the total context of community
growth and development. The municipality must come forward with
a variety of evidence to prove that its prohibition is valid, and the court
must engage in a sophisticated process of weighing this evidence and
balancing the interests involved. Although the judicial task will thus
be more difficult than under other approaches to total use exclusions,
the outcome may be more equitable.
II
FACTORS IN A BALANCING TmST

Balancing tests applied previously by courts have examined (1)
the character of the legislative classification in question; (2) the relative
importance of the rights of the individual in the class discriminated
against; and (3) the asserted governmental interest supported by the
classification. 61 Using these considerations as general guidelines, a court
might weigh the following factors in balancing a total prohibition of a
legitimate use against the "right of ownership and the concomitant use
of property." 62
A.

The Character of the Community
Determining the value of preserving the character of the community and the value to the individual of being able to use his property for
a legitimate but excluded use is the most important and probably most
difficult task for the courts in applying a balancing test. In a 1961 New
Jersey case involving a community ordinance that completely excluded
trailer parks,6 3 the appellate division found the community to be relatively rural and sparsely settled.6 4 Because of this fact, the court said,
the constitutional rights of individual citizens. Thus, the burden of proof imposed
upon one who challenges the validity of a zoning regulation must never be made
so onerous as to foreclose, for all practical purposes, a landowner's avenue of redress against the infringement of constitutionally protected rights.
National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 522,
215 A.2d 597, 607 (1965).
61 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969).
62 Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 246, 263 A.2d 395, 399 (1970) (concurring opinion).
03 Vickers v. Township Comm., 68 NJ. Super. 263, 172 A.2d 218 (App. Div. 1961),
rev'd, 37 NJ. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962).
64 Id. at 269, 172 A.2d at 221.
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we find it impossible to reconcile the complete exclusion of trailer
parks .... Surely, in this vast rural area, there must be some pordon in which the operation of trailer parks would be compatible
with the scheme of zoning the township has seen fit to select, and
yet would not adversely affect existing or future uses of property
located anywhere in the township, and however zoned.6 5
Although the New Jersey court thus held that the township could not
legitimately exclude trailers, it is possible that the same court would
hold the exclusion valid were a small,6 6 densely settled, residential community involved. The nature of the community therefore seems to be
a significant factor to be considered. The New Jersey Supreme Court
in another case, for example, ultimately upheld a total prohibition of
heavy industry, using these words:
There is no constitutional or statutory provision which would lead
us to conclude that a municipality in the adoption of a comprehensive zoning scheme is compelled to set apart a portion of its territory for heavy industrial use without regard to its suitability there6

for. 7

In addition to size and density, other characteristics of a community might also be judicially considered 68 in determining the validity of
a particular exclusion: the strain the use might place upon the availability of water or other natural resources; availability of public
utilities; the current condition and potential expansion of transportation facilities; protection of property values; and even aesthetics. 69
Other considerations include the pattern of existing uses in particular
zoned districts, the natural contours and topographical features of the
land, and the potential effect of drainage and seepage alterations on
water and sewage problems.7 0 The range of possible community characteristics that may have a bearing is as wide as the spectrum of possible
uses that might be excluded. Ultimately the answer lies in a realistic
65 Id. at 270, 172 A.2d at 222.
66 Gloucester Township had an area of 32 square miles. Id. at 269, 172 A.2d at 221.

67 Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 NJ. 509, 512, 64 A.2d 347,
349 (1949) (emphasis added).
68 Thus it may be said that the ratio decidendi is whether the total prohibition
bears a reasonable relationship to the purposes of zoning in light of the existing
zoning pattern of the township, and the past, present and foreseeable future
development of land use within its borders. To these factors must be added,
among others, the area of the municipality, the size of its population, and in
connection therewith the impact, if any,.., upon land values and the general
public welfare.
Vickers v. Township Comm., 68 N.J. Super. 263, 269, 172 A.2d 218, 221 (App. Div. 1961).
69 See Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 55, 400 P.2d 255 (1965).
70 Bogert v. Washington, 25 N.J. 57, 185 A.2d 1 (1957).
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appraisal of the community's interests and the character of the prohibited use.
B.

The Availability of Alternative Remedies

The enacting municipality should show why the use is prohibited
and why there are no regulatory alternatives to the enactment of a
prohibition. Exclusion, with its accompanying negative economic overtones, is a drastic step. Two alternative remedies already suggested are
the nuisance doctrine and regulatory ordinances. 71 A final possibility
might be the outright condemnation, with full compensation, of land
necessary to the use.
The Hardship on the Attacker
The interests of the municipality should be balanced against the
adverse impact of the restriction upon the individuals involved. While
hardship in itself does not make an ordinance invalid, 72 it should be considered in the overall evaluation of the ordinance's validity.73 In considering hardship, courts should weigh the profit which would accrue
to the individual owner were the prohibition rescinded, against the
resulting detriment to the public welfare.7 4 The court should also consider the potential diminution of neighboring property values were
the use allowed."
C.

D. The Potentialfor Relocation
Connected with the hardship factor is the unavailability of other
sites for the excluded use. The court in Exton reasoned that
if one municipality may, with only moderate justification, totally
prohibit an undesired use of land, it is not unlikely that surrounding municipalities will do the same-thus increasing the distance to
an alternative site and the concomitant economic disadvantage.76
As the court noted, this reasoning is even more forceful when the prohibited business can only be carried on at a few locations.77
71 Note 24 and accompanying text supra.
72 Standard Oil Co. v. Marysville, 279 U.S. 582 (1929); Stoltz v. Ellenstein, 7 N.J. 291,
81 A.2d 476 (1951); Kerr's Appeal, 294 Pa. 246, 144 A. 81 (1928).
73 See, e.g., Martin v. Rockford, 27 IIi. 2d 373, 189 N.E.2d 280 (1963) (increased
property values absent zoning restrictions held to be one consideration in deciding
whether ordinance is valid).
74 Evanston Best & Co. v. Goodman,, 369 IM. 207, 16 N.E.2d 131 (1938).
75 Elmhurst Nat'l Bank- V. Chicago, 22 IM. 2d 596, 176 N.E.2d 771 (1961); see also

8 E. McQUILLEN, supra note 2, §§ 25.44-46.
76 425 Pa. at 59-60, 228 A.2d at 179.
77 E.g., the extraction of natural resources. Id. at 60, 228 A.2d at 179.
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The availability of alternative sites can be of paramount importance. In Duffcon Concrete Products,Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill,78 the
court allowed a ban on all heavy industry, reasoning,
[W]here, as here, there exists a small residential municipality the
physical location and circumstances of which are such that it is best
suited for continuing residential development and, separated therefrom but in the same geographical region, there is present a concentration of industry in an area peculiarly adapted to industrial
development..., the power of the municipality to restrict its territory to residential purposes ... is cdear.79
The Reasonable Relationship Test

E.

Another consideration in balancing the interests of the community
against those of the legitimate user is whether the prohibition in fact
does promote the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community. In balancing, this would not be determinative but would
simply be one factor in the overall evaluative scheme, albeit an important one. A mere showing by the municipality of a reasonable relationship between its prohibition and the public welfare should not,
however, automatically preclude an attacker from prevailing, as it
would under Euclid were a mere regulatory ordinance involved.
F. The Right of a Community To Plan for the Future
Courts are split on whether the validity of a zoning ordinance
should be judged according to a projected plan of community development 0 or whether an ordinance should be judged in light of the conditions that currently exist.8 ' In the area of total use exclusions, the
best and most flexible approach would be to consider both the plan
for future community development and the actual character of the
community. This approach is more certain and less inequitable than
allowing municipalities total freedom to zone for the future according
to subjective projections of currently desired growth patterns; the alternative solution, to judge a prohibition's validity only with reference
to conditions as they currently exist, would deny all administrative
flexibility and stifle imaginative planning.
78 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949).
Id. at 515, 64 A.2d" at 351 (emphasis added).
8O-E., Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965).
81 E.g., Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d
169 (1967); Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 1 Pa. Cmwlth, 458, 275 A.2d 702,
79

remanded, -

Pa. -,

285 A.2d 501 (1971).
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CONCLUSION

Application of a balancing test to determine the validity of a legitimate business use exclusion eliminates many of the problems inherent in other approaches. An onerous burden of proofs2 is removed
from the attacker and is placed upon the municipality, the party with
the particular expertise. The courts are given flexibility to proceed
beyond presumptions of validity and harsh burden of proof rules
towards consideration of the factors involved in specific situations,
thus effecting a more equitable reconciliation of the general welfare
83
and the rights of individual landowners.
Robert A. DuPuy
82

ie., proving a negative. See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra.

83 It has been suggested that the problem of local use exclusions could be eliminated

by creation of regional zoning boards. Within a large enough region there would be
room for all legitimate uses. Further, the narrow political interest a community has in
maintaining its character would be counterbalanced by representation on the board of
the interests of the other member communities of the region. Greater flexibility and more
imaginative planning could be achieved without abandoning the original purposes of
zoning. This was the apparent conclusion of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Duffcon:
What may be the most appropriate use of any particular property depends
not only on all the conditions, physical, economic and social, prevailing within
the municipality and its needs, present and reasonably prospective, but also on the
nature of the entire region in which the municipality is located and the use to
which the land in that region has been or may be put most advantageously. The
effective development of a region should not and cannot be made to depend
upon the adventitious location of municipal boundaries, often prescribed decades
or even centuries ago, and based in many instances on considerations of geography, of commerce, or of politics that are no longer significant with respect to
zoning. The direction of growth of residential areas on the one hand and of
industrial concentration on the other refuses to be governed by such artificial
lines.
Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 513, 64 A.2d 347, 349-50
(1949).

